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Russian Military: After Ivanov
By Pavel Felgenhauer
(Pavel Felgenhauer is an expert on Russian military affairs, a columnist for Novaya 
gazeta and a frequent contributor to Perspective.)
Sergei Ivanov was Defense Minister for almost six years, from March 2001 to February 
2007 - the longest serving Defense Minister since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991. Ivanov is President Vladimir Putin’s close personal and political friend and is 
today considered in Moscow to be Putin’s probable successor. In a year, Ivanov may be 
selected and officially elected to take over the Kremlin.
In October 2004, Putin’s former chief of staff (until October 2003), Aleksander Voloshin, 
told me that of all his cohorts Putin trusts Sergei Ivanov most. As Voloshin put it: “Ivanov 
is the only intimate of Putin, who never lied to him.” Ivanov is so special, apparently, 
because of all the rest that are close to Putin, he is the only one not fully corrupt. 
Voloshin said that top Russian officials supply the president with false information to 
lobby special interests and to collect bribes. Putin, according to Voloshin, accepts as 
inevitable this corruption of his associates, but this sets Ivanov apart from the others 
even more. Ivanov was, together with Putin, a student in St. Petersburg in the 1970s, 
when they were both recruited by the KGB.
Ivanov was appointed Defense Minister in 2001 with a very special task to reconstruct 
Russia’s Armed Forces. The state of the military was dismal, and Putin believed that 
speedy reform was essential to national survival.
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In May 2006, in his annual national address to parliament, Putin recalled the shock he 
experienced in the fall of 1999, while Prime Minister, as he planned the invasion of 
Chechnya: “The Chief of General Staff reported that the Army could field only 55,000 
men and even they had to be scraped up from all over the country. We had an armed 
force of 1,400,000 men, but there was no one ready to fight. We sent untrained boys to 
battle. I’ll never forget it. We must ensure this will never be repeated.” (1)
Former Duma deputy from the liberal Yabloko party and well-known defense researcher, 
Aleksei Arbatov, insists that the ineffectiveness of the present military “was 
demonstrated by the tragic experience of two wars in Chechnya, in which altogether 
more than 50,000 soldiers were killed and wounded.” Hazing, crime, suicide and fatal 
accidents cause approximately one thousand fatalities annually among the military 
personnel of the Defense Ministry. Arbatov believes that only the abolition of 
conscription may significantly increase the level of professionalism and revamp the 
military. (2)
As Defense Minister, Ivanov initiated a program of increasing the number of contract 
soldiers, of creating so-called permanent readiness units, manned exclusively by 
volunteers, and of reducing conscript service to one year by 2008. However, 
conscription has not been abolished and the official position of the Defense Ministry and 
the Kremlin is that conscription in Russia will continue indefinitely.
According to General Vladimir Konstantinov of the Organizational-Mobilization Main 
Directorate of the General Staff, in 1994 the government allocated sufficient budget 
funds to recruit 280,000 contract soldiers. Later, the number of “contractniki” decreased 
substantially and, at present, the Defense Ministry hopes only to reach the 1994 figure. 
Konstantinov told reporters at a briefing in the Defense Ministry on April 27, that, in the 
1990s, more than half of the conscript soldiers were female, serving in combat positions 
as, for example, machinegun operators along with men. According to Konstantinov, in 
1999 all female contract soldiers of the Leningrad Military District 138th and 200th 
permanent readiness motor-rifle brigades refused to go to fight with their units in the 
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second Chechen campaign, causing immense problems in refitting the units with men. 
At present, the share of female contract soldiers in Russia has been reduced to 24 
percent and the Defense Ministry plans that, in the future, females will not occupy 
combat positions.
By the end of this year, the Defense Ministry is to have 72 permanent readiness all-
volunteer units with some 130,000-contract soldiers. An additional 130,000 contract 
soldiers will be serving in other units together with conscripts. By the end of 2007, the 
Defense Ministry plans to have 94,200 places in military barracks specifically 
designated for accommodating contract soldiers.
In November 2006, during a nationally televised phone-in, Putin announced that “from 
2000 to 2005” defense spending had increased three and a half times, that, between 
1991 and 2006, the number of military personnel under the Defense Ministry had been 
reduced almost to one-third and that today the number stands at 1,131,000. Putin has 
announced that the military today is smaller, better equipped and more effective. When 
relieving Ivanov of the post of Defense Minister on February 15, Putin thanked him for 
fulfilling his mission of stopping the degradation of the military, of revamping contract 
service and solving the social woes of servicemen. Ivanov was promoted to the rank of 
first deputy premier in charge of Russian industry, including the defense industry. (3)
In fact, the true picture is not that rosy. Contract soldiers are unprofessional and often 
leave units at will – male soldiers as well as female. The number of personnel in 
Russia’s so-called “power structure” or “siloviki” ministries and services is a state secret 
and is not regularly published. However, in December 2003, during a national phone-in, 
Putin announced, “The number of military personnel in Russia and those of the same 
legal status is 4 million.” Since then, there have been no further drastic cuts. This 
accurate number of soldiers is huge and such an inflated force cannot possibly be 
“efficient.”
3
While actively creating all-volunteer units, the Defense Ministry has not established any 
professional recruiting service and does not seem to have any plans to do so. Most of 
the contract soldiers are recruited by the unit commanders from conscripts who often 
are forced by longer-serving soldiers to sign contracts while undergoing hazing. A recent 
report describes three young soldiers in an elite ranger GRU “spetsnaz” unit near 
Yekaterinburg in the Urals region, who were forced to sign three-year contracts after 
only three months of conscript service. Sergeants serving under contract also forced the 
novice soldiers to hand over all their contract pay as soon as they received it.
Such problems are widespread. General Konstantinov agrees that most contract 
soldiers do not fulfill their standard three-year contract, but leave after serving only two 
years. At best, a conscript soldier who was forced to sign a contract tends to leave his 
unit as soon as his time of conscript service is up. To force the soldiers and sergeants to 
keep their contracts, the Defense Ministry has introduced a regulation that one day of 
service as a conscript is equal to two days as a volunteer. This means that after only 
serving two years as a contract soldier, a conscript officially will have completed also his 
one-year compulsory service and is free to go.
This contract system, which Ivanov is credited with creating, is in essence just another 
version of a regular Soviet Gulag. According to Konstantinov, contract soldiers today in 
Chechnya get 20,000 Rubles ($770) a month. In the regions directly surrounding 
Chechnya they are paid 15,000 Rubles ($577) and in all other Russian regions they 
receive roughly 8,700 Rubles ($335). The pay is not particularly attractive, the service 
conditions are harsh, and the soldiers are not truly motivated.
The drastic increase in defense spending during Ivanov’s term as Defense Minister did 
not provide our military with new, modern weapons, did not increase substantially the 
professionalism of the rank and file, and did not remove poverty and social stress. 
Painful cuts in personnel levels that could have allowed increased spending per soldier 
to provide better equipment, pay, and training did not take place.
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The main reason our military chiefs are so stubbornly resisting the abolition of 
conscription is the desire to retain the capability to raise multimillion soldier armies to 
fight major regional or even global non-nuclear wars, while also sustaining the capability 
to fight nuclear wars. The idea to create a relatively small, effective, well-trained and 
equipped force to fight in local and regional conflicts, while countering all other threats 
with nuclear deterrence, has been rejected time and again by the Russian military 
establishment. The Russian military doctrine adopted in April 2000 insists that Russia 
should continue to maintain the capability to mobilize millions of reservists, as well as a 
massive industrial mobilization potential to enhance defense production many-fold in 
times of crisis.
The expansion of NATO to the east, the revolutionary transformation of the US military 
after 9/11 and its redeployment to forward positions, including former Warsaw Pact 
nations and some bases in former Soviet republics, have created deep splits within 
Russia’s ruling bureaucracy. Of course, all uniformly oppose what is happening, it’s the 
mode of response that is causing controversy.
In many public speeches Putin and Ivanov have called for the creation of a more 
compact, well-armed, modern military. At the same time Russia’s high brass still insists 
upon sustaining a mass mobilization armed force with relatively cheap, mass-produced 
tanks and guns. The legacy of World War II is still considered, in our military academies, 
as the finest of modern military tactics, operational art, and strategy. Suggestions that 
would drastically cut numbers in exchange for increasing quality are dismissed as pro-
Western diversions that are intended to “disarm Russia” in the event of an imminent US-
led NATO invasion.
Russia is trying to have a Soviet-type mass army of conscripts and reservists to counter 
NATO and at the same time is assembling many contract soldiers to form better-trained 
professional units. The result is a strategic compromise that merges irreconcilable 
patterns of military planning and development.
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Any mass mobilization in Russia today is a dream, since its reservists are not trained 
and the mobilization stockpiles of tens of thousands of heavy weapons in the storage 
bases are old and mostly non-operational. The newly-formed permanent readiness units 
manned by contract soldiers, formed to fight low-intensity local wars and conduct 
peacekeeping operations, are equipped with old weapons leftover from a conscript 
Soviet force and are inadequately trained.
In November 2004, at a meeting of the top brass in the Defense Ministry and in the 
presence of Putin, Ivanov announced that only 64 percent of the “permanent readiness 
units” were ready for action in 2004 (in 2003, the figure was 62 percent). “The fighting 
potential of our permanent readiness units does not allow them to act rapidly to contain 
any local conflict or emergency situation in any potential strategic theater,” Ivanov 
reported. (4) Today, officially, the situation with battle readiness has improved, but did it 
really?
In January and April 2000, Putin signed a National Security Concept and a Military 
Doctrine. (5) Putin authorized both documents, but the texts were prepared during the 
Yel’tsin administration. Since then, the Putin administration has failed to produce any 
new comprehensive defense or national security policy document.
The present Military Doctrine and Security Concept stipulate that Russia does not have 
enemies, but faces threats that may be coming from all directions and in many forms. 
The United States, NATO, Japan, China, and Iran are named “partners,” but also are 
seen as potential adversaries. Internal and international terrorism poses an additional 
military/security threat. Such an opaque concept of defending against all possible 
threats does not provide any clear guidelines on what military force the nation needs 
and against whom.
Since 2001, Moscow has announced many times that new official defense/national 
security documents are being prepared and will soon be approved. In 2004, the 
Secretary of the Security Council Igor Ivanov (the former Foreign Minister) announced 
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that “a new National Security Concept is being developed.” Ivanov implied that the new 
Concept is needed “to meet 21st century challenges.” (6) The concept was never 
developed.
In October 2003, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov presented a half-baked prototype 
Military Doctrine known in the West as the White Paper. This Paper did not expand into 
anything.
In recent months, the worsening relations with the West and constant talk of a new Cold 
War have intensified discussions about rewriting the Military Doctrine. In January 2007, 
a special meeting of Russia’s Academy of Military Sciences discussed a new Military 
Doctrine. Legally, the Academy is an independent think-tank, but its connections with 
the Defense Ministry are strong, and Russia’s military chiefs attended the meeting to 
make keynote speeches.
The President of the Academy General Makhmut Gareyev, who, as a four-star general 
was considered in the 1980s to be the leading Soviet military strategist, announced that, 
“All nukes of all other nations in the world are in essence aimed at Russia.” General 
Aleksandr Rukshin, Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff, 
called for the “creation of self-sufficient military groupings on all strategic directions.” All 
of the military chiefs demanded major increases in defense spending for all the 
services, to meet all the threats. Gareyev called for a major concentration of national 
resources, comparable with the Soviet nuclear arms program under Josef Stalin, to 
create modern weapons in order to rearm our military.
In 2007, the Russian defense budget increased by 23% and reached 860 billion Rubles 
($35 billion). Russia’s top brass wants much more. The generals, led by Gareyev’s 
Academy, want to rewrite the Military Doctrine to eradicate its ambivalence, to name 
clearly the US and NATO as the number one enemy, and to mobilize the nation and its 
present oil wealth to begin a genuine arms race and Cold War.
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After January, it seemed that the Military Doctrine indeed would be rewritten soon. In 
March 2007, the Security Council announced that it was working on the text of a new 
Military Doctrine. However, there is substantial opposition to rewriting the Doctrine. On 
February 7, 2007, answering questions in the Duma, Ivanov announced that Russia 
does not need a new Military Doctrine, because “one already exists, it is fairly new, it 
contains some fundamental things, including terrorism, the threat of the spread of WMD 
and internal conflicts.” Ivanov added, “The world has not changed all that much since 
then,” and if we indeed will need a new Doctrine, the Security Concept must be first 
rewritten. (7)
One week after that statement, Ivanov left the post of Defense Minister, but was 
promoted and seems now more powerful. The fray surrounding the Doctrine reflects the 
dualism of Russia’s present leadership that wishes to be against the West and part of 
the Western establishment at the same time. Others in the ruling elite do not want to 
give away Russia’s oil wealth to generals. The constant inconsistency of Russian 
statements and political moves will continue.
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